The Urban Revolution

by Richard Burke


Many of the great revolutions of past centuries have been urban affairs. The names of major cities have been irrevocably linked with revolutionary uprisings: Paris with the French Revolution, the Paris Commune of 1871, and the events of May 1968; Barcelona and Madrid with the Spanish Civil War; and St. Petersburg with the Russian Revolution. In light of this history, it is strange how little theorizing has been devoted to thinkers of the world left to the place of the city in movements for social change. Much of Marxian thought has centered around the factory and its labor struggles, while Anarchism has often displayed a nostalgia for the rural commune. This ignores a basic reality—that the world is steadily becoming more urbanized. According to the UN, 2007 marked the tipping point: the first time in history that 50% of the human race was living in cities. That percentage has only increased in the years since.

Thankfully, we have the work of David Harvey to correct this oversight. His new book, Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution, is a much needed attempt to drag Marxist theory out of the factory and into the wider context in which the factory exists—that of the city. In doing so, he has displayed an insight which allows him to transcend the dilemma in which much Marxian theorizing has been trapped for the past four decades. This is the question of the relevance of a theory centered on industrial workers in an age where industrial employment (in the developed world at least) is in decline, while that in the service sector increases. By placing this issue within the context of the city, Harvey allows us to think in terms of the production of the urban environment.

Rebel Cities begins with a discussion of the work of the French Marxist and sociologist Henri Lefebvre. A dissident former member of the French Communist Party, Lefebvre was a major influence on the New Left for his pioneering work in which Marx’s early concept of alienation was applied to the investigation of everyday life. In the 60s, his thought increasingly turned towards the investigation of urban life, in particular the spread of gentrification. Lefebvre was one of the first to notice the increasing trend to make the city oriented towards the needs of the wealthy, and to dispossess workers and the poor of their access to urban life. It was he who coined the slogan “the right to the city,” recognizing that the revolution of the future would essentially be an urban one. As Harvey comments:

Only when politics focuses on the production and reproduction of urban life as the central labor process out of which revolutionary impulses arise will it be possible to mobilize anti-capitalist struggles capable of radically transforming daily life.

By moving the focus of Marxist theorizing from the workplace to the city, Harvey reveals a site of ongoing struggles and a wealth of organizational forms with a potential to challenge and undermine capitalism. What has often been presented as workers’ revolts are more properly urban revolts, and the people involved in them are not necessarily industrial workers.

Focusing on cities rather than workplaces allows us to recognize the roles which people in a variety of occupations, in both industrial and service sectors, play in the production and reproduction of urban life. It is this central labor process, the production of the urban, which the capitalist class seeks to expropriate for its own profit.

Harvey shows us that historically there has been a long series of struggles over the right to the city and who is to benefit from the production of the urban. For example, during the reign of Louis Bonaparte in the 19th century, Baron Haussmann was given charge of the project to redesign Paris, a project undertaken precisely in order to prevent urban revolts from taking place.

The wide avenues associated with Paris today are part of a conscious plan to make it harder to erect barricades. Yet despite his efforts, the Paris Commune of 1871 erupted in the wake of the Franco-Prussian war. The efforts of Haussmann were nonetheless well appreciated by a later planner, Robert Moses, who was responsible for the building of the highways in New York City in the 40s and 50s which led to suburbanization, urban sprawl, and the decay of inner-city neighborhoods.

This process, repeated throughout the United States, played a major role in the stabilization of capitalism after the Second World War. The capitalist class and its planners are well aware of the centrality of the city to the continued expansion of investment opportunities for capitalism. Here one can see clear connections between the theories of Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy in Monopoly Capitalism with
Harvey’s views on the production and reproduction of urban life. The spread of urbanization becomes an opportunity for a monopoly capitalist world-system that continually generates a surplus needing to be profitably re-invested. The role that governments play in facilitating this process provides the outside aid that monopoly capital needs in order to counteract its inherent tendencies to stagnation.

Harvey calls attention to the fact that capitalist crises have their roots firmly in the production of the urban. In particular, he points out the connection between the bursting of housing bubbles and economic crises. Data is presented showing that expansions in building and real estate markets, and their eventual collapse, are closely correlated with economic expansions and downturns. If the production of the urban is the central activity of capitalist profitability, this is precisely what one would expect to find. The fact that the most recent economic crisis, the worst since the Great Depression, was triggered by the bursting of a housing bubble is common knowledge. What Harvey does here is to show that such events have happened repeatedly. In purely Marxist terminology, overproduction in the urban production process is a cause of capitalist crisis.

Harvey agrees with Hardt and Negri’s observation that the metropolis is a “factory” for the “production of the commons.” Here he takes issue with those who misuse the concept of “the tragedy of the commons” as a justification for privatization and deregulation. The real tragedy lies in the appropriation of the commons for private profit, and the negative externalities that result from this. In a chapter called the “Art of Rent,” he reflects on the concern with intellectual property rights as a form of rent. Here he echoes the views of Andre Gorz in The Immaterial regarding the ways in which capitalist profitability has increasingly become a form of rent-seeking. Applying this to the production of the urban, he notes that it is precisely the unique characteristics of a city which capitalists seek to market profitably. In so doing they undermine and destroy those qualities which make a city unique by seeking to capitalize on them. These unique qualities derive precisely from the collective production and reproduction of the urban commons, which the capitalist class seeks to monopolize for themselves. In doing so, they engender resistance and revolt.

Thus we come to the revolutionary explosions which began in 2011, and which are continuing at the time of this writing. As Harvey points out, these are yet again urban revolts, in which the urban commons—in particular, city squares and parks—become sites of resistance. Syntagma Square in Athens, Tahrir Square in Cairo, and Zuccotti Park in New York are all places where the masses attempt to reclaim the urban commons from appropriation by the capitalist class and its managers. These are the “Rebel Cities” of the book’s title. Harvey here reveals the wealth of organizational forms in which anti-capitalist resistance takes place. Not just in workplace struggles but in the organization of neighborhood councils. Would the sit-down strikes of 1930s labor struggles have succeeded without the support of the larger community outside? By recognizing the centrality of the production of the urban to the capitalist world-system, Harvey has targeted precisely where and how an anti-capitalist revolt might be successful.

While Rebel Cities is a ground-breaking work, it provides little in the way of concrete blueprints as to how we might reorganize urban life. There is nothing said regarding how we might make cities more sustainable. Perhaps here we might have a thing or two to learn from the Arcology of Paolo Soleri or the designs of R. Buckminster Fuller. Nothing is said about what kinds of renewable energy will be necessary to maintain urban life in a world plagued by anthropogenic global warming. There is little about how we might reorganize the economies of cities in a socialist manner, nor are we given ideas on how struggles in isolated cities might be coordinated to become a successful global revolt against the monopoly capitalist world-system.

Yet perhaps this is too much to expect from one small book. The value of Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution is precisely that it provides a starting point for the rethinking and reimagining of a successful socialist revolution. The revolution will be urban—or not at all.

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Inside the Psyche of the 1%

by Don Fitz

Do the rich and super-rich tend to be psychopaths, devoid of guilt or shame? Are the 1% lacking in compassion? Does their endless accumulation of possessions actually bring them little to no happiness? To each of these, the answer is “yes”—but a very qualified “yes” with lots of subtleties. Even more important is what these issues suggest for building a society which does not ravage the last remnants of wilderness and rush headlong into a climate change tipping point.

Strange concepts of psychopathy

The word “psychopath” often elicits an image of a deranged murderer. Despite Alfred Hitchcock’s chair-gripping “Psycho,” stabbing victims in the shower is not a typical activity of psychopaths. They are more often con artists who end up in jail aftercheating their victims. Classic definitions of psychopathy include features such as superficial charm, anti-social behavior, unreliability, lack of remorse or shame, above-average intelligence, absence of nervousness, and untruthfulness and insincerity. [1]

Most of those in the mental health industry sternly observe that a strict set of consistent rewards and consequences is the only treatment that works with psychopaths. But they admit that even this treatment might not work too well. Progressives may dismiss observations by psychologists because the field tends to explore a behavioral pattern as it exists in a certain Western culture at a given point in history and then imagine that it characterizes all people at all times. Psychology has a long tradition of bending to current race, gender and sexual orientation biases. Its class bias is reflected by the dominant portrayal of psychopathy.

Consider what William H. Reid, MD, from the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Texas Health Sciences Center in San Antonio writes about psychopaths:

I have no wish to dehumanize people when I say that those who purposely endanger others in our streets, parks, and schools, even our homes, are qualitatively different from the rest of us. I care less and less about why they’re not the same as the rest of us; the enemy is at our door…There is no (reasonable) ethic which requires that we treat him as other adults; indeed, to do so is foolish. [2]

Reid chides those who recoil at the thought of suspending rights: “While we have been interminably discussing this weighty issue, the psychopaths, who don’t trouble themselves with contemplations, have been gaining ground.” [5]


These words are excerpted from an essay in the scholarly volume Psychopathy: Anti-Social, Criminal and Violent Behavior. The text is predominantly a collection of reports and syntheses under academic headings of “Typologies,” “Etiology,” “Comorbidity” and “Treatment.” The portions quoted illustrate that intense hostility directed towards victims of the criminal justice system is within the acceptable continuum of published academic thought on psychopathy.

A demon with two horns

The words from Reid reflect what is called the “categorical view.” It maintains that the difference between “psychopaths” and “normals” is as clear-cut as the difference between left-handedness and right-handedness.

A contrasting perspective, with a large amount of research to back it up, is the “dimensional view.” It regards psychopathy and other “personality disorders” as exaggerated expressions of normal behavior. Just as we are all more or less compassionate, we all have the ability to be manipulative and deceitful. We act so when we think that circumstances warrant it.

Some people think circumstances warrant it a whole more than others do. “Pure” psychopaths are
examined in case studies of flim-flam hustlers; they make the evening news; and they become topics of TV shows. But there are many more “marginal” psychopaths who score high on some aspects of the disorder but not on others.

The dimensional view also recognizes that psychopaths can be more or less successful. A fellow psychologist once told me that she feels that the psychopaths she sees in therapy are the less successful ones. While most psychopaths are a little more intelligent than average, she thought that successful psychopaths are much more intelligent and run corporations as well as the military, government, and educational and religious institutions.

The concept of “successful psychopath” is not new. An early text described “complex psychopaths” who were very intelligent and included unscrupulous politicians and businessmen. [6] By the 1970s it was more widely recognized that “this category includes some successful business men, politicians, administrators.” [7] In other words, the unsuccessful psychopath might go to jail for swindling dozens of people with home improvement scams while successful psychopaths might swindle millions with bank deals, get bailed out by friends in government, and never spend a day in jail.

Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of the medicalization of the disorder is how the psychiatric establishment departed from science in order to grant partial exemption from being characterized as psychopaths to the wealthy. According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association, in order to receive a diagnosis of “anti-social personality disorder” (i.e., psychopathy) a person must exhibit at least 3 of 7 listed behavior patterns. These include “arrest,” “physical fights or assaults,” and “failure to sustain consistent work behavior.” [8] This means that those who can pay off cops (or never have charges pressed against them due to their social status), or pay someone else to commit violence on their behalf, or own companies instead of having to work for a living are all less likely to receive an official label of “psychopath.”

An increasing number of psychologists are becoming aware that traditional research was limited by the bias of only looking at people in jail. One wrote that subjects in psychopathy research “were usually institutionalized at the time of testing, and consequently our research may not accurately capture the internal structure and dynamics of the successful antisocial or psychopathic individual.” [9]

Support for the concept of successful and unsuccessful psychopaths is provided by the discovery that the “Psychopathic Personality Disorder” syndrome actually has two factors. [10] Statistical analyses have revealed an “emotional detachment” factor, which includes superficial charm and skill at manipulating others, as well as an “anti-social behavior” factor, which includes poor impulse control and the tendency to engage in activities that are illegal.

Multiple studies have confirmed that run-of-the-mill psychopaths (often studied while in jail) score particularly high on anti-social behavior while successful psychopaths score higher on emotional detachment factors. For example, Babiak [11] looked at “industrial psychopaths” and found that they scored higher on “emotional” factors than “deviant life style” factors. Functioning smoothly in the corporate world, they had a “charming façade” that allowed them to easily manipulate others.

In a study of “disordered personalities at work” other researchers [12] were able to give personality tests to business managers and chief executives. They contrasted their personality scores to psychiatric patients and “mentally disordered offenders.” Compared to the mental patients, the corporate executives showed greater “emotional” components of personality disorder and less “acting out” (such as aggressiveness).

The authors concluded that “participants drawn from the non-clinical population [i.e., business managers] had scores that merged indiscernibly with clinical distributions.” There were no clear-cut differences between “psychopaths” and “normals.” The most likely explanation of psychopathy is that, like any other personality dimension, it has a bell-shaped curve: a few people have almost none of the characteristics, most people have some

There were no clear-cut differences between “psychopaths” and “normals.”

characteristics of psychopathy, and a few people have a lot. The most visible outliers for people high on psychopathy scales are petty con artists and corporate conniving. Operating in different worlds, their psychopathy expresses itself in different ways.

Now that it is clear that a streak of psychopathy runs through the 1%, it would be worthwhile to go back to those who espouse that “there is no ethic which requires we treat him [the psychopath] as we treat other adults” and ask if that would apply to corporate psychopaths as well. Will editors of scholarly volumes seek out articles heaping abuse on the 1% with the same vigor with which they find articles despising prison inmates? Will academics proclaim that “public health needs” dictate that we suspend civil liberties of corporate executives even if they “have not been convicted of any crime”? Will professors compare the “needed treatment” of the 1% to the “necessary slaughter” of animals?

Since academics know very well where funding for their research comes from, my guess is that they will be a wee bit less harsh on the corporate class than the jailed burglar who provides no grant money.
We can be confident that the Tea Party will not be proposing that, if corporate psychopaths who blast the tops off of mountains wreak 1000 times the havoc of petty thieves who steal copper wire from air conditioners, then their punishments should be 1000 times as great. Yet, it is important not to overstate the evidence and suggest that every capitalist is a psychopath. Not all corporate executives score high on scales of psychopathy. This is likely because many actually believe their ideology of greed makes for a better world.

What causes human compassion?

Compassion reflects the opposite of psychopathy. When those with wealth and power plan to strangle social security, they never say they intend to hurt people, but rather they want to help them stand on their own. When corporations drive native people from forests, they tell us it is part of their grand scheme to stop climate change. Are we to believe that they are just as compassionate as everyone else…but that they reveal their compassion in their own way? There is now good evidence that there are, in fact, class differences in levels of compassion.

By definition, the rich and powerful have more material resources and spend more of their time telling others what to do. Those with fewer material resources get told what to do. As a result, the rich value independence and autonomy while those with less money think of themselves as more interdependent with others. [13] In other words, the rich prize the image of the “rugged individual” while the rest of us focus on what group we belong to.

How do people explain the extremely unequal distribution of wealth? Those with more money attribute it to “dispositional” causes—they believe that people get rich because their personality leads them to work harder and get what they deserve. Those with less money more often attribute inequality to “external” factors—people’s wealth is due largely to events beyond their control, such as being born into a rich family or having good breaks in life. [14]

People with fewer financial resources live in more threatening environments, whether from potential violence, being unable to pay medical bills, or fearing the possibility of being evicted from their homes. This means that social classes differ in the way that they view the world from an early age. Children from less financially secure homes respond to descriptions of threatening and ambiguous social scenarios with higher blood pressure and heart rate. [15] Adults with lower incomes are also more reactive to emotional situations than are those with more money.

This means that people with fewer financial resources are more attentive to others’ emotions. Since low income people are more sensitive to emotional signals, they might pay more attention to the needs of others and show more altruism in response to suffering.

This was the thinking behind research linking higher income to less compassion. In one study people either watched a neutral video or one depicting a child suffering from cancer. People with lower income had more change in their heart rate and reported feeling more compassion. But they did not rate other emotions as higher. Social class could be linked to compassion more than to any other emotion. [16]

In another study, people reported their emotions toward a partner when the two of them went through a hypothetical job interview. Lower income people perceived more distress in their partners and expressed more compassion toward them. Again, they did not report more intense feelings of other emotions. Nor did participants show more compassion toward people with the same income level as their own. [17]

Like most psychological research, these findings are limited by their use of university students. This makes it hard to conclude that their findings apply to those not in school. Of course, it is quite possible that effects would be even stronger in situations that are far more intense than the somewhat mild experiences that occur in psychological laboratories. A greater problem is interpreting psychological findings as showing absolute differences between groups rather than shades of grey.

It would not be accurate to claim that research proves that the 1% have no compassion while all of the 99% do. But it strongly implies that the 1% feel less compassion, whether watching a videotape of suffering or participating in a live social interaction. Also, lab studies are consistent with findings that people with fewer financial resources give a higher proportion of what they do have to charity. In economic game research, they give more to others. [18]

This line of research confirms that (1) people with fewer financial resources identify with a larger “in-group;” (2) “attention to and recognition of suffering is a prerequisite step before compassion can take place;” and (3) “moral emotion is not randomly distributed across social classes…” [19] Compassion toward the suffering of others is less likely among the 1%.

The happiness paradox

The endurance of the story of Scrooge reflects a deeply ingrained understanding that replacing
compassion with a devotion to accumulating wealth will not bring fulfillment. But it is not that simple. What I call the “happiness paradox” flows from two consistent yet seemingly contradictory findings:

1. At a given point in time, higher income is positively associated with happiness; but,
2. Over time, per capita income can rise greatly with no rise in happiness.

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... there should have been less depression during times of greater prosperity. Exactly the opposite occurred.

Let’s look at the first of these. It is true that there is a positive correlation between income and happiness. People who make more money describe themselves as happier. But the diminishing returns of the happiness curve are profound. The greatest reason for the correlation is the huge jump in happiness as people move out of poverty into the world of survive-ability. At higher income levels, more money is associated with extremely small increases in happiness. In fact, moving from the ninth to the tenth (top) income category only increases happiness 0.02 point on a 10-point scale. [20]

Similar effects occur when comparing countries. Those living in rich countries are happier than those living in poor countries. Again, there are diminishing returns, due to the large effects of moving out of abject poverty. Once an income of $10,000 was reached during the 1990s, additional income did very little. [21] A 10% increase in income in a country with half the income of the US was associated with an increase in happiness of 0.0003 on a 10-point scale. [22]

While smaller increases in happiness occur with advances to successively higher income levels, even this effect is wiped out in comparisons across time. US per capita income has increased dramatically since WWII, while happiness has not changed or even decreased slightly. Between 1946 and 1991, real income rose from $11,000 to $27,000 (in 1996 dollars) but happiness was constant. [23] Another study found that from 1940 to 2000 people in the US earned three times as much with no increase in happiness. [24] The most spectacular growth in the capitalist world occurred in Japan, which saw a six-fold increase in per capita income from 1958 to 1991. Yet, there was no change in happiness. [25]

These portraits are all painted from people’s self-reports of how happy they are. Looking at happiness in a more “objective” way suggests that it could actually have decreased at the same time that material possessions were increasing. Presumably, people who are happy have fewer bouts of major depression. If increased income resulted in more happiness, then there should have been less depression among Americans who grew up during times of greater prosperity. Exactly the opposite occurred.

Compared to those born in 1925–1935, those born in 1945–1955 had twice the probability of a major depressive episode, and those born after 1955 had the highest rate of depression. [26] Suicide may be the most objective measure of happiness (or unhappiness). Data reveal that America’s economic growth spurt occurred simultaneous with a rise in the suicide rate of 7.6 per 100,000 in 1950 to 12.4 per 100,000 in 1990. [27]

Though it would be false to say that money cannot buy any happiness, it would be even worse to say that money can buy lots of happiness. Why then is having more money at a given point in time associated with more happiness (even if only slightly so) while increases in income over time fail to bring more happiness? It is largely because of class divisions and the obsession of capitalist culture with material objects.

When a generation of objects first comes into being (whether jewelry, cars or cell phones), only a few can afford them. The many who cannot buy them endure a fabricated emptiness. Over the next few decades (or years or months) the price of the object falls, ownership becomes commonplace, and a new fad is concocted to stimulate desire. Though the process predates capitalism by many centuries, it is the glorification of object possession in capitalist society that inflates it beyond reason.

Before the 1920s, give or take a decade or two, capitalism was producing largely for needs, with the luxury items of the rich being the exception. But as it became clear that it was possible to satisfy the basic necessities of the vast majority, the 1% began a brave new adventure into the world of manufactured needs and planned obsolescence. Products designed to go out of style or fall apart became more frequent until they became the norm following WWII. [28]

Of course, people accepted this fetishism of things to a great or lesser degree—some Christians still thought that spirituality was more important than bowing to golden calves. One of the best known psychological critics of the emerging life style was Abraham Maslow, who coined the phrase “deficiency orientation” to explain those who wrap their lives around the illusion that happiness can be found in material goods. [29]

Sociologists wrote of “aspiration level theory,” “positional goods” and “status symbols” to describe the purchase of objects whose major value is to demonstrate that the owner possesses something that most others do not. Studies documented that people who prize material possessions are significantly less happy. [30]

Karl Marx wrote of the prime directive of capitalism being to “Accumulate, accumulate!” [31] Decades before the end of the twentieth century,
capitalism had spread its pathological world view and created a new law of accumulation:

**Manufactured Needs = Manufactured Unhappiness**

It is well documented that possessions do not bring happiness; but, then, what does? Recent research has confirmed what philosophers have written and religions have preached for millennia. Happiness is associated with close personal relationships and control over essential parts of one’s life. [32] One study which interviewed college students found that those who were the most happy (1) spent more time with others and (2) reported more satisfying relationships. A society dominated by the 1%, however, pushes us in the opposite direction. In 1985, 75% of Americans reported having a close friend, but by 2004 that had fallen to 50%. [33]

One of the more interesting experimental studies had some participants do five favors for people in a single day. Weeks later, they still felt better than those who did not practice altruistic behavior. [34] Life might be less pleasant among those whose urge to get ahead makes them less compassionate and less likely to do unsolicited nice things for others.

### The exponential addict

The 1% could easily find compassion getting in their way as their actions affect an increasing number of lives. Gaining enough wealth to move out of poverty makes a significant difference in the life satisfaction of a person who has little. Gaining the same amount of wealth has no effect on the happiness of the very rich. They must grab the wealth of many impoverished people in order to have a perceptible increase in happiness. As for a drug addict, the rush from an increase in material possessions of those who already have more than enough is merely a temporary fix.

Soon they will have to prevent even more from rising out of poverty if they are to get another short-term happiness rush. Whether the rush is from the actual possessions or the power that they manifest, it still won’t be enough. They must increase the rate of wealth accumulation that they push through their veins. If those with spectacular quantities of obscene wealth are to get their next high, they cannot merely snort enough happiness objects to prevent masses of people from rising **out of poverty**—they have to manipulate markets to grind an ever-increasing number **into poverty**.

The petty psychopath and the grand corporate psychopath seek happiness through the act of **obtaining** material possessions as much as **having** them. A major difference between them is that the grand psychopath has the ability to cause so much harm. Even more important, the amount of harm that corporate psychopaths cause grows at an exponential rate. Their financial schemes are no longer millions or billions, but now trillions. Not content to drive individual farmers off their land, they design trade deals that force entire countries to plow under the ability to feed their own people and replace it with cash crops to feed animals or produce biofuels.

Finding that the pollution of small communities generates insufficient funds, they blow off the tops of mountain ranges for coal, raze boreal forests for tar sands, attack aquatic ecosystems with deep sea drilling, and contaminate massive natural water systems by mining gold or fracking for gas. While the petty psychopath may become proficient enough to become a godfather, the grand psychopath is driven not merely to planetary destruction but to a frenetic increase in the rate of destruction at precisely the moment when the tipping point of climate change is most haunting.

A natural question might seem to follow: Would getting rid of the current batch of corporate psychopaths benefit the world greatly? Actually, no. It would do no good whatsoever because what psychologists call the “reward contingencies” of the corporate world would still exist. The fact that capitalism prizes accumulation of wealth by the few at the expense of the many would mean that, even if the worst corporate criminals disappeared, they would soon be replaced by marketplace clones.

Progressives should avoid using the same “categorical” model so adored by right wing theorists for its utility in hating the poor. A much more promising strategy is to create a community that does not encourage norms of manipulating people without compassion.

### Relationships of people to people can never flourish as long as relationships of people to objects reign supreme.

A certain kind of society tends to produce a certain kind of person. More precisely, it discourages the development of certain human capacities and fosters the development of others. Aristotle, Rousseau, Marx and Dewey were the philosophers who were most illuminating on this. They argued that the postures required by successful functioning in a market economy tend to...
insinuate themselves into those areas of social intercourse which take place outside of the realm of the market proper. The result, they claimed, was that the arena for potentially altruistic and sympathetic behavior shrinks over time as society is gradually transformed into a huge marketplace. [35]

As mentioned, there are differences in compassion and types of psychopathy between high and low income people. But the differences are not large. Perhaps, even in the corporate board room, many feel the old norms of group loyalty. It is also possible that differences are small, not because of the unwillingness of corporate executives to be ultra-manipulative, but because capitalism pushes everyone toward a “use people” mode.

Thus, building a new society involves going beyond equalizing material wealth. It means changing the core nature of interpersonal relationships. This requires vastly reducing the emphasis on material possessions. Relationships of people to people can never flourish as long as relationships of people to objects reign supreme.

As long as society continues to be deeply divided between those who tell others what to do and those who get told, it will not be possible to establish the emotional sharing that is the basis of widespread altruism. If the 1% are to develop the same level of understanding of others that the 99% has, they will need to walk in their shoes. If they continue to be the ones who live their lives telling others what to do while the rest of us continue being told what to do, they will not develop levels of compassion typical of the 99%.

This means that in office jobs, they should be able to share the joys of typing letters rather than ordering others to type for them. If we decide mining is necessary, those who are now the 1% should get to know that work life. In work at home, they should not be excluded from washing toilets but should participate in the same human activities as the rest of society. Creating a world of universal compassion requires a world of shared experiences.

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Sources
3. Ibid., 116.
4. Ibid., 114.
5. Ibid., 114.
There is no "one" about the one percent.

And what it takes is business acumen.

Against your dull will. Now we're businessmen,

Did what it took to drag you from the mud

So you could keep your hands clean. Men of blood

We took your jobs and shipped them overseas

The chiefs took risks that now have made your ease.

Live by the knife and never toil again."

My might has done this. Swear yourselves my men.

With all the value working fools have made

A power center built for us to fill

You'll drink beer in my stockade on the hill,

"While other men hoe weeds and shovel shit,

Took a few warriors and turned cattle thief.

Not you? That's how it's been since the first chief

Will get you women by the futonful.

Or logging data in a cubicle

Talking is easy work with a headset,

Your thumbs are fluent with a phone, I bet.

If you're ready to settle for what's real.

That's your ambition. I'll make you a deal,

A burger, a beer, a pack of Oreos,

Watch TV, drink and download videos?

Besides, what would you do with it, punk boy?

A power center built for us to fill

Or slink back into town to dumpster-dive

Bolt off into the woods and chase your prey,

You think you got it tough? Turn runaway.

Pampered, well-fed, sheltered from the storm.

I own you, but I keep you safe and warm,

You have the freedom of the family dog.

Can't have it. Get your mind out of the fog.

You want freedom from corporate control?

From birth to deathbed you are on my dole.

And take advantage of what makes me rich.

The wealth that lies beneath the useless soil.

They haven’t got the guts to shake the earth

The hand stuck from a suit that shakes and steals.

Manipulating money, doing deals,

Some keep their fingers clean living off rent,

The hand stuck from a suit that shakes and steals.

And turn it inside out for all it’s worth.

That’s what I do. I mine for coal and oil,

Some keep their fingers clean living off rent,

And turn it inside out for all it’s worth.

They haven’t got the guts to shake the earth

And turn it inside out for all it’s worth.

That’s what I do. I mine for coal and oil,

The wealth that lies beneath the useless soil.

Your thumbs are clean. You only flip a switch

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The wealth that lies beneath the useless soil.

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Alternative Future

The plains are empty for a time of hungry foes who sow their blood. We settle in aickle clime, one year drought, the next year flood.

The prophets warned us not to waste the riches of the sea and soil, but none would hear who had a taste for floating drunk on burning oil.

They died like leaves from plague and death, or fought for sterile merchandise. For those too weak to learn the earth suicide parties closed their eyes.

The corporate men have turned warlords, enslaved the cities’ refugees and beaten car hoods into swords. It’s either starve or bend your knees or come to us who still live free. Their power is fading. Ours will rise. We work and share in peace, but he who comes to rob our harvest dies.

Developers built Babel’s pyre in scorn of the unyielding sod. We dig redemption from the mire and earn with sweat the bread of God.

—Henry Robertson

Against Miserabilism (cont. from inside front cover)

cynically crow about the “absurdity of reality.” Miserabilism is systematically encouraged and spread by capitalism because it is its most powerful weapon against revolt.

That the World-Left has been in a depressed and despairing state of mind for decades is not a merely personal observation. Immanuel Wallerstein, originator of “world-systems analysis,” commented on this a decade ago in The Decline of American Power. Wallerstein observed that this depressed state could not simply be explained by recent electoral victories by the right and analyzed it as having two main causes: the defeat of the left’s “two-step” strategy pursued for over a century, and the loss of belief in inevitable progress.

The “two-step” strategy Wallerstein refers to was what the left had historically seen as its path to success. Step one: take state power, step two: transform the world. The problem is that by the 1960s the World-Left had been quite successful in achieving step one, whether in its Marxist Leninist or Social Democratic approaches, but step two did not happen.

The “actually existing socialist” regimes turned into totalitarian parodies of the idea of socialism. Social Democrats, despite having offered worthy reforms, lost sight of a vision of economic justice and democracy, content to accept capitalism while making it “kinder and gentler.” As a result, the world’s population began to lose faith in the ability of the left to pull off step two.

The second cause, a loss of the belief in inevitable progress, is more subtle and insidious. Part of the problem lies in the fact that the belief in the inevitability of progress is not strictly speaking a left-wing viewpoint, but has historically functioned as an enabling myth for the capitalist world system, and was accepted by left, right, and centrist political currents. This was the idea that the direction of historical time was essentially an ascending arrow, leading to the “good society” sometime in the future. The development of science and technology guaranteed this outcome, and while the present might be dark, the future would necessarily be bright.

The left embodied this optimism perhaps more than the center or right political currents. The early socialists were unabashedly utopian, putting forth plans for social reconstruction which they hoped would, by their very desirability, lead to their adoption on a global scale. Marxism would later appear, ostensibly eschewing utopianism and offering a critique of capitalism instead. Can anyone deny that there was nonetheless an undercurrent of utopian hopes that sustained the Marxist movement? Marxism might avoid explicit utopianism, yet looked forward to communism, a stage of social development based on the principle of “from each according to their ability, to each according to their need,” and where the state would wither away, the administration of people abolished by the administration of things.

This began to change after World War Two, leading to the situation Breton critiqued in the world of art and by extension the larger global society coming into being. The most destructive war in history, the horrors of the holocaust, and above all the development of nuclear weapons contributed to this mind-set. Surrealism, which had dominated the prewar cultural world, was succeeded by existentialism, with its essentially pessimistic view of the absurd human condition.

In the 60s, a growing awareness of the ecological limits to growth began to appear. Science and technology, once seen as unquestioned benefactors of human society, were now recognized as being capable of delivering a dystopia as well as a utopia, or perhaps even the extinction of the human race itself. Existentialism was succeeded by Postmodernism, with its rejection of “grand narratives,” a despair over the existence of Truth itself, and a rejection of the possibility of progress.

Thus the present depressed situation of the World-Left today. The defeat of the “two-step” trat-
egy is in some ways the most easily remedied of the two causes. 
The alternative would be a strategy which is not purely statist in 
orientation, but which complements electoral efforts with direct 
action and extra-parliamentary struggles. After all, the left has a 
long, suppressed history of advocating decentralized and self-
managed approaches to socialism.

From Syndicalism and Guild Socialism to “Parecon” and Participatory Planning, any number of models has been offered as an alternative to a centrally planned command economy, or merely Keynesian government management of economic activity. This does not necessarily imply a strictly Anarchist strategy, but the combining of extra-parliamentary struggles with political parties pursuing policies consciously crafted to aid those struggles. Perhaps the problem is one of historical inertia; having placed such an emphasis on statist approaches, the collective intellect of the World-Left is still dominated by those who placed their hopes in these strategies.

The second cause is somewhat harder to address. “Inevitable progress,” while not a strictly left-wing idea, played a major role in providing a sense of optimism which sustained the left. At times it could be a profoundly depoliticizing idea. After all, if the future would inevitably be better than the past, then what is the need for activist work? The loss of this belief is nonetheless profoundly demoralizing; yet here, too, we could look to the past for clues to ways to get out of our present dilemma.

Charles Fourier, the Utopian Socialist most beloved by surrealists, had a philosophy of history with ascending and descending arcs. For Fourier, history since the appearance of the human race was on a descending arc, one which would end with the adoption of his schemes for social reform and initiate an ascending arc of history that would last for 80,000 years. Gustav Landauer, the anarchist thinker who nonetheless accepted the post of minister of education in the Munich Soviet Republic at the end of the First World War, rejected the belief in inevitable progress, yet advocated that, “Socialism need not come…but Socialism can come and should come, when we wish it.”

In more contemporary times, Immanuel Wallerstein has advocated a view that progress is not inevitable, but is possible. His world-systems analysis recognizes the reality of cycles in history, but because no cycle returns to its exact starting point, there is nonetheless a “secular drift” which insures that no world-system is immortal. In his view, we are coming to the end of the capitalist world-system’s life cycle, and it is precisely in such periods that individual and collective action has the possibility of changing things. The choice before us for the middle of this century is between two possible world-systems, one which attempts to maintain the hierarchies and inequalities of capitalism in a new form, and one which is more democratic and egalitarian. Environmentalists should take note that it is precisely the ecological crisis that Wallerstein sees as one of the factors leading to the end of capitalism.

Yet there is a further problem for the World-Left, which Wallerstein’s analysis leaves unaddressed. This is that the left has become a movement of people who pride themselves on being hardheaded realists. Now hardheaded realists are very good at analysis and critique, but lousy at offering visions of alternative. Even worse, they find it logically and psychologically impossible to avoid philosophies of despair. Doing so undermines the hardheaded realist philosophy they pride themselves on! This is problematic for a movement for social change. After all, human beings have put up with conditions of despair and misery for thousands of years, yet only occasionally do they revolt against this situation.

The real question is not why they don’t revolt, but why they at times do. The answer is that people revolt when they become convinced that it is possible to succeed; that they can really change their condition. Now just how successful will a depressed, despairing movement of miserablists moaning that “we’re all doomed, we can’t win” really be in inspiring such revolts? Creating a democratic, libertarian socialist alternative is a project that will involve a great deal of effort and work. These efforts will not succeed in gaining wider support in the absence of an optimistic, even utopian, attitude on the part of the World-Left.

This is the challenge that the World-Left faces in the coming years: to learn to value imagination, intuition, and the ability to inspire even more than the ability to analyze and reason. Not to reject reason and evidence, for these too are absolutely necessary, but not sufficient. We must learn the wisdom of valuing creativity over critique, of optimism over pessimism. There are, ultimately, such things as self-fulfilling prophecies. Miserablism is such a self-fulfilling prophecy, one which will undermine all efforts to prove that “another world is possible.” To be successful in its political aims the World-Left must purge miserablism from its collective heart and mind!

R. Burke is an activist, artist, writer, and teacher living in St. Louis.